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Abstract We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of
semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, commit-
tive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manu-
script “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that
(1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2)
committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize
this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that,
using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the
reverse of (2) may hold (but the proof relies on substantive assumptions). This
suggests that there are no three different notions of inference emerging from
Brandom’s definitions, but at most two, and perhaps even just one. Secondly,
this result puts into question the connections between the three inferential
relations and the familiar notions of deduction and induction.
Keywords Incompatibility entailment · Committive consequence ·
Permissive consequence · Inferentialism
E. Andrade-Lotero (B)




Department of Philosophy - Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam,
Oude Turfmarkt 141-147, 1012, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
42 Philosophia (2012) 40:41–53
Introduction
An important aspect of Brandom’s philosophy of language is the reconstruc-
tion of “autonomous discursive practices” in terms of propositions, assertions,
and declarative sentences (BSaD, p. 117).1 The latter is a syntactic notion, and
we will not deal with it here. The other two notions, namely propositions and
assertions, are treated by semantics and pragmatics, respectively.
On the semantic side, the notion of the semantic content of a proposition is
defined in terms of its specific inferential articulations (see, for instance, MiE,
pp. 133ff). Such inferential articulations are understood in a normative way:
“Content is understood in terms of proprieties [in the sense of correctness] of
inference, and those are understood in terms of the norm-instituting attitudes
of taking or treating moves as appropriate or inappropriate in practice” (MiE,
p. 134). Proprieties of inference are normative statuses, and as such they are
grounded in the practice of giving and asking for reasons.
According to Brandom, the content of an expression is conferred by the
intentional states that ground its use in language. “For it is the practical
inferential proprieties acknowledged by such attitudes [of treating an infer-
ence as correct or incorrect] that make noises and marks mean what they
mean” (MiE, p. 174). Nevertheless, Brandom’s explanatory strategy consists in
explaining simultaneously both the content of expressions and the content of
intentional states. It is a methodological requirement, therefore, that semantics
and pragmatics be simultaneously accounted for in terms of the practice of
giving and asking for reasons. This leads us to consider this practice in more
detail.
In the practice of giving and asking for reasons, the fundamental move is
that of making an assertion. To make an assertion is to make a particular move:
According to the model [of the game of giving and asking for reasons],
to treat a performance as an assertion is to treat it as the undertaking
or acknowledging of a certain kind of commitment . . . Doxastic commit-
ments are essentially a kind of deontic status for which the question of
entitlement can arise (MiE, p. 142, emphasis in the original).
Being committed and being entitled are normative statuses, which are
grounded in the participants’ mutual attributions of these statuses to one
another. In Brandom’s framework, the ability to attribute commitments and
entitlements are conditions of possibility for the practice of assertion. Besides
this fundamental ability, a story must be told as to how they combine in
order to give rise to the inferential practices which eventually constitute the
contents of assertions. Indeed, “the inferential articulation [of assertions], in
1Henceforth, BSaD is an abbreviation for Brandom (2008); MiE is an abbreviation for Brandom
(1994); CCDP is an abbreviation for Brandom’s unpiblished “Conceptual Content and Discursive
Practice”.
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virtue of which they deserve to be understood as propositionally contentful,
consists in consequential relations among the particular doxastic commitments
and entitlements” (MiE, p. 142). Thus, not only are the abilities to attribute
commitment and entitlement fundamental, but so are the abilities to relate
commitments (entitlements) to other commitments (entitlements):
[T]here are two abilities that must be had by any system that can deploy
any vocabulary, as part of the autonomous discursive practice of which
the use of that vocabulary is a part: the ability to respond differentially to
some sentence-tokenings as expressing claims the system is disposed to
assert, and the ability to respond differentially to moves relating one set
of such sentence-tokenings to another as inferences the system is disposed
to endorse (BSaD, p. 44, emphasis in the original).
Brandom defines three different notions of inferential consequences, based
on the notions of commitment and entitlement. They are defined as follows
(see BSaD, pp. 120f; MiE, pp. 168–9):2
Committive consequence: We say that p committive entails q, denoted as
p unionsq→q, if and only if whenever a speaker S is committed to p, S is
committed to q.
This kind of inference corresponds to examples like “A is to the West of B,
so B is to the East of A; This monochromatic patch is green, so it is not red”
(MiE, p. 168).
Permissive consequence: We say that p permissive entails q, denoted as
p →q, if and only if whenever S is entitled to p, S is prima facie entitled to q.
This kind of inference corresponds to examples like “the claim that this is a
dry, well-made match can serve as a justification entitling someone to the claim
that it will light if struck” (MiE, p. 169). It is worth noting that Brandom’s
definition of the notion of permissive consequence seems to have changed
between MiE and BSaD. This point is relevant for present concerns but we
will only come back to it in Section “A Closer Scrutiny of the Hierarchy”.
The third inferential relation is based on the notion of incompatibility. We
say that p is incompatible with q if and only if commitment to p precludes
entitlement to q, and commitment to q precludes entitlement to p. The notion
of incompatibility has been taken to define (part of3) the semantic content
of propositions and performances—the content of p is the class of all q such
2The symbolic convention is ours. It is also worth noting that, although it is acknowledged that
inferences can have more than one premise, for ease of presentation we will restrict ourselves to
the single-premise case in this paper.
3That the notion of incompatibility only defines part of the semantic content of propositions and
performances is relevant for the present purposes. We will come back to this point later on in
Section “A Closer Scrutiny of the Hierarchy”.
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that p and q are incompatible (BSaD, ch. 5)—, and gives rise to the notion of
incompatibility entailment:
Incompatibility entailment: We say that p incompatibility entails q, denoted
as p →q, if and only if for all r, if r is incompatible with q, r is
incompatible with p.
This kind of inference corresponds to examples like “If my first pet (in fact,
let us suppose, a fish) had been a donkey, it would have been a mammal”
(BSaD, p. 122).
What is the purpose of these different inferential consequences and what
role do they play in Brandom’s account? Brandom claims that they are related
to—in the sense of ‘to represent’, or ‘to capture’—the familiar inferential re-
lations of deduction and induction. Committive and permissive consequences
relate to these familiar notions in the following way: the former corresponds
to a generalization to the material case of deductive inferences, and the latter
to a generalization to the material case of inductive inferences (BSaD, p. 121;
MiE, pp. 168–9). The third inferential relation, incompatibility entailment, is
characterized by Brandom as a “counterfactual-supporting, modally robust
inferential relation” (BSaD, p. 121). For ease of presentation, we will refer
to this relation as robust inference.
Now, the claim that committive and permissive consequences relate to
material deductive and inductive inferences is what seems to give substance
to the more general and programmatic claim that practical inferential abilities
amount to knowledge of the meaning of words and expressions.4 Indeed, as
we saw above, Brandom contends that meaning can be analyzed in terms of
proprieties of inference, which in turn are accounted for in terms of practical
inferential abilities. But the claim that meaning can be analyzed in terms
of proprieties of inference holds water only if we accept that knowledge
of inferential relations can amount to knowledge of meaning.5 It is in this
sense that it becomes important, for instance, that committive consequence
connects with material deductive inferences, so that the committive inference
from “A is to the west of B” to “B is to the east of A” can play the role
4The point is essential in the case of non-logical vocabulary, as opposed to the case of logical
constants. In the latter case, both the semantic interpretation of validity and our present-day
plurality of logical systems—where the main difference among them lies in their interpretation
of logical constants—, makes it natural to connect rules of inference with the meaning of logical
constants. The situation is not nearly as natural in the case of non-logical vocabulary. It is the
material aspect of inferences that seems to provide the connection with meaning in the case of
non-logical vocabulary, and what explains the relevance of connecting committive and permissive
consequences with material deductive and inductive inference, respectively.
5What Brandom intends is something stronger: that participation in a practice that gives rise to
the proprieties of these inferential relations amounts to knowledge of meaning of expressions.
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of a ‘meaning constitutive’ inference of the expressions “west” and “east.”6
Thus, the purpose of this connection is to make a discussion of inferential
consequences intuitively appealing as an analysis of meaning.
In CCDP (pp. 23–25) Brandom argues that one can use the dimensions of
authority and responsibility of assertions in order to determine the following
relations between the three inferential consequences:
If p incompatibility entails q, then p committive entails q. (1)
If p committive entails q, then p permissive entails q. (2)
In the next section, we show how Brandom constructs this hierarchy of
inferential consequences, as discussed in CCDP. In Section “A Closer Scrutiny
of the Hierarchy”, we present two problems with this hierarchy, one internal
and one external. Firstly, by unpacking Brandom’s own definitions, we show
that a different hierarchy emerges, as both the reciprocal of (1) and the
reciprocal of (2) (the latter under certain special conditions) hold. Secondly,
with respect to the external problem, we inquire to what extent the hierarchy
allows for a connection between Brandom’s different notions of inferential
consequence and the more familiar notions of robust, deductive, and inductive
inferences. We conclude by presenting a number of considerations and open
questions raised by our discussion.
The Hierarchy of Inferential Relations
Let us now look more closely at the way in which Brandom articulates the three
inferential consequences in CCDP. The internal role that these inferential
consequences play in Brandom’s account is to underwrite the inferential
practices that eventually constitute the content of assertions. And the way they
do this is by playing a particular role in the game of giving and asking for
reasons.7 The fundamental move in this game is making an assertion, which
Brandom accounts for in terms of the notion of “undertaking a commitment”
(MiE, p. 167). This is spelled out in terms of the dimensions of authority and
responsibility of assertions. Brandom claims that:
In producing assertions, performers are doing two sorts of things. They
are first authorizing further assertions (and the commitments they
6That inductive inferences are also important in their meaning constitutive role depends on
Brandom’s rejection of a distinction between knowledge of language and knowledge of the world.
Such a rejection can be best appreciated in his discussion of rational rectification (cf. BSaD, ch. 6),
but a discussion of this aspect of Brandom’s philosophy of language is beyond the scope of this
paper.
7For reasons of space we cannot give a detailed account of this role, but see MiE, pp. 190ff.
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express), both concommitant commitments on their part (inferential
consequences) and claims on the part of their audience (communicational
consequences). In doing so, they become responsible in the sense of
answerable for their claims. That is, they are also undertaking a specific
task responsibility, namely the responsibility to show that they are entitled
to the commitment expressed by their assertions, should that entitlement
be brought into question (MiE, p. 173, emphasis in the original).
The gist of the argument in the construction of the hierarchy based on
(1) and (2) is to take the dimensions of authority and responsibility as a
characterization of doxastic commitments. It is in virtue of this characterization
that it can be proved that a scorekeeper is committed to a claim, which is a
necessary step in the proof of (1), as we shall see in a moment. To this effect,
suppose that S is a speaker and p a sentence. What S does when she asserts
p is to undertake (and acknowledge) a commitment, which can be spelled out
along the two dimensions of responsibility and authority as follows. We say
that S is committed to p if and only if:
Responsibility: S has to respond to any challenge to p.
Authority: S authorizes others to be committed to p. This means that S has
to be prepared to make his own any challenge to p addressed to others. Or,
conversely, that others can discharge responsibility to show entitlement to
p by deferring it to S.
Besides the two dimensions of responsibility and authority, an analysis of
commitment requires us to spell out in somewhat more detail the notion of
challenge. In the model of giving and asking for reasons, challenge is an impor-
tant notion; it is a speech-act that constitutes a move in the game of giving and
asking for reasons. However, in line with Brandom’s contention that assertion
is the fundamental speech-act (MiE, p. 172), a challenge is understood in terms
of assertion (otherwise assertion would not be the basic speech-act Brandom
deems it to be). Therefore, one “can challenge an assertion only by making an
assertion incompatible with it” (MiE, p. 178).
With these definitions at hand, we first prove that p →q entails p unionsq→q,
that is, (1), and next we proceed to proving (2).
Proof In order to prove (1) suppose that p →q and that S is committed to p.
We show that S is committed to q by showing (i) that S has to respond to any
challenge to q; and (ii) that S authorizes others to assert q:
(i) Suppose q is appropriately challenged with r, which is incompatible with
q. Then p is appropriately challenged with r as well, because p →q
and therefore r is incompatible with p. In other words, if p →q and
r is a challenge to q, then r is a challenge to p. Furthermore, since S is
committed to p, he has to respond to r. Thus, we have just shown that S
has to respond to any challenge to q.
(ii) By assumption, S authorizes others to be committed to p. This means that
he will make his own any challenge to p addressed to other people. But
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since any challenge to q is a challenge to p, he also has to make his own
any challenge to q. unionsq
This proves that p →q entails p unionsq→q. Now we turn to the proof of (2):
Proof Suppose that p unionsq→q and that S is entitled to p. In his presentation of
the game of giving and asking for reasons, Brandom states that S “can [be]
attribute[d] entitlement to any claims that are committive-inferential conse-
quences of commitments to which [she] is already taken to be entitled” (MiE,
p. 191). This means that, given p unionsq→q, unless S is entitled to q, he cannot be en-
titled to p. But since we have assumed the latter, S has to be entitled to q.8 unionsq
Brandom claims that the order of this hierarchy is “strict”—i.e., that the
‘if. . . then’ in (1) and (2) are not reversible, although he does not give any
explicit reason for it. One argument that might support the claim that (2) is
not reversible is the following construction of a counterexample (which, by
the way, we will challenge below). Consider how Brandom defines permissive
consequence as inheritance of entitlement in MiE:
Inheritance of entitlement (being entitled to one claim as a conse-
quence of entitlement to another) is what will be called a permissive,
or entitlement-preserving inferential relation. Inductive empirical infer-
ences exploit relations of this genus. The premises of these inferences
entitle one to commitment to their conclusions (in the absence of counter-
vailing evidence) but do not compel such commitment. For the possibility
of entitlement to commitments incompatible with the conclusion is left
open (MiE, p. 168, emphasis in the original).
This definition leaves room for the following interpretation. Permissive
inference comes down to inheritance of entitlement. If p →q and S is entitled
to p, S is entitled to q. The claim that a permissive inference is defeasible
consists in the following. While S is entitled to q, it could be the case that
he cannot commit to it despite his commitment to p. For S could already be
entitled to r, where r is incompatible with q, but not with p. Thus, should S
8More than a proof, this is just one way to formulate the articulations involved in the game of
giving and asking for reasons. In fact, (2) is explicitly stated in a discussion of such articulations:
“If one is entitled to p and p commitment-entails q, one is entitled to q—any entitlement-defeating
incompatibilities to q equally defeat entitlement to p” (MiE, endnote 43, p. 674). The proof
that appears in CCDP is the following: “We can see in much the same way why if there is a
commitment-preserving inference from p to q, there is also a (prima facie) entitlement-preserving
inference from p to q. For if everyone who is committed to p is thereby committed to q, then on
the side of authority, in authorizing others to assert p, I am thereby authorizing them to assert
q. And to say that is to say that they can inherit entitlement to q from my entitlement to p. And
on the side of responsibility, in undertaking the responsibility to justify or otherwise vindicate my
entitlement to p, I am thereby undertaking the responsibility to justify, or otherwise vindicate my
entitlement to q. So I cannot be entitled to p unless I am also entitled to q, which is to say that
there is a good inference from p to q preserving prima facie entitlements” (CCDP, p. 24).
48 Philosophia (2012) 40:41–53
commit to p, this will not be followed by a commitment to q. Clearly, this
implies that p unionsq→q is not valid.9
A Closer Scrutiny of the Hierarchy
Brandom claims (CCDP, p. 25) that the ‘if. . . then’ in (1) and (2) are not
reversible. However, under a closer scrutiny, there are reasons to doubt the
accuracy of this claim. Indeed, we shall prove, on the basis of Brandom’s own
definitions, that the converse of (1) holds. In other words, we can prove that
(3) holds:
If p committive entails q, then p incompatibility entails q. (3)
This means that if (1) holds, Brandom’s own conceptualization of the
notions of incompatibility entailment and committive consequence allows the
two notions to collapse into each other: a claim not without consequences, as
we will show below. The proof of (3) is the following:
Proof Suppose that p unionsq→q. We need to show that p →q. Let r be such that it
is incompatible with q. We shall prove that r is incompatible with p. Consider
the notion of p being incompatible with r paraphrased as follows:10
(i) If S is committed to p, S is not entitled to r.
(ii) If S is committed to r, S is not entitled to p.
(i) If, on the one hand, we assume that S is committed to p, by the
assumption that p unionsq→q it follows that S is committed to q. Since r
is incompatible with q, S cannot be entitled to r.
(ii) On the other hand, if we assume that S is committed to r, since r
is incompatible with q, then S cannot be entitled to q. This means
that if S were to assert q, he could not fulfill his responsibility to
show entitlement to q. This would not be the case if S were entitled
to p, since he could discharge his responsibility with respect to q by
asserting p, given that p unionsq→q.11 Therefore, S is not entitled to p. unionsq
We have just shown that r is incompatible with p. Therefore, if p unionsq→q, then
p →q. In view of (1), we have that p unionsq→q if and only if p →q.
Moreover, under certain conditions, we can prove (4):
If p permissive entails q, then p incompatibility entails q. (4)
9It is worth noting that this version of defeasibility is not in conflict with the assumption that the
counterpositive of a permissive inference is valid.
10It might be worth stressing that this paraphrase is nothing over and above Brandom’s own
definition of incompatibility. It is just a slightly different way of presenting the original definition.
11“If one is entitled to p and p commitment-entails q, one is entitled to q” (MiE, endnote 43,
p. 674).
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The f irst condition states that the incompatibility relation is symmetrical, in
the sense that if one denies that p and q are incompatible, one is denying both
(i) If S is committed to p, S is not entitled to q, and (ii) If S is committed to
q, S is not entitled to p. In other words, we must assume that (i) if and only
if (ii). We take it that this is what Brandom has in mind when he imposes the
condition of symmetry over the incompatibility relations that are “suitable as
semantic primitives” (BSaD, p. 123).12
The second condition is contentious. We must assume that the counter-
positive of a permissive consequence is valid. That is, from the fact that S
is not entitled to q we should be able to derive that S is not entitled to p.
This assumption is contentions because permissive consequence is meant to be
defeasible (or valid only prima facie).13
Under these conditions we can prove (4):
Proof We prove that if p →q then p →q. Suppose that p →q and that r is
incompatible with q. The latter assumption implies that if S is committed to r,
S cannot be entitled to q. Since entitlement to p implies entitlement to q, by
contraposition it follows that S cannot be entitled to p either. By symmetry of
incompatibility, it follows that r is incompatible with p. unionsq
We can use (4) to show that the argument used at the end of Section
“The Hierarchy of Inferential Relations” to produce a counterexample of
the reverse of (2), that is, that permissive consequence entails committive
consequence, is no longer sound. Under the assumptions that p →q and that
S is entitled to p, the argument is intended to show that p unionsq→q is not valid, that
is, that S can be committed to p without being committed to q. The argument
requires one to assume that S is already entitled to r, where r is incompatible
with q, so that S cannot be committed to q. But the argument also requires that
it be possible for r to be incompatible with q without being incompatible with
p. However, by (4), p →q entails p →q. Thus, r is also incompatible with p.
Therefore, S cannot be committed to p and thus we cannot show that p unionsq→q
is not valid.
With this counterexample out of the way, we can prove that the reciprocal
of (2), that is (5), holds (under the condition that (4) holds):
If p permissive entails q, then p committive entails q. (5)
Proof The proof of (5) follows straightforwardly from (4) and (1). unionsq
12“I will only consider symmetric incompatibility relations. This is an intuitive condition because
it is satisfied by familiar families of incompatible properties: colors, shapes, quantities, biological
classifications, and so on” (BSaD, p. 123).
13Robert Brandom pointed out this caveat during the presentation of this paper at the Workshop
on Brandom’s Analytic Pragmatism in Genoa, April 2009. Pete Wolfendale made a similar point
in personal communication.
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If the proof of (4) is indeed sound, not only is permissive consequence
equivalent to committive consequence (in virtue of (2) and (5)), but all three
consequences, on Brandom’s own definitions, turn out to be equivalent. Note
that we are not suggesting that there is no genuine distinction between these
three notions. Rather, what we suggest is that Brandom’s own formulation of
them does not succeed in capturing the distinction, if indeed there is one.
It turns out that Brandom adapted, or rather, clarified, his definition of
permissive consequence in BSaD:
And one takes or treats q as an inferential consequence of p in an-
other sense by being disposed to attribute entitlement to the claim that
q to whomever one credits with entitlement to the claim that p. As
will appear, entitlement-preserving inferences are always defeasible; the
entitlement one acquires thereby is only prima facie. One is not entitled
to the conclusion of a good entitlement-preserving inference if one is
committed to something incompatible with it. (BSaD, pp. 119f including
footnote 2.)
In this case, the counterpositive of a permissive consequence is not valid,
that is, one can be entitled to the antecedent and yet find out that one cannot
be entitled to the consequent. Thus, the proof of (4) does not go through.
What remains unclear, however, is the fact that, given (2), there are permissive
consequences the counterpositives of which are valid, namely, the permissive
consequences that we can obtain from committive consequences following
Brandom’s own endorsement of (2). The latter are not defeasible,14 so they
give rise to undefeasible permissive consequences. This seems problematic
given Brandom’s own claim that “[a]s will appear, entitlement-preserving
inferences are always defeasible” (BSaD, p. 120, emphasis added).
Nevertheless, to bring the internal criticism of the hierarchy to a close, we
claim that the equivalence between incompatibility entailment and committive
consequence holds, while the equivalence between committive and permissive
consequences is more problematic. In any case, this shows that, on the basis
of Brandom’s own arguments and definitions, the hierarchy is different from
what he claimed it to be in CCDP.
Now, turning to the external criticism of the hierarchy, a few points call for a
closer inspection, given that the connections among the three inferential conse-
quences have repercussions for the possibility of relating them to more familiar
notions of inferential relations. We have seen in Section “Introduction” that
such a connection is paramount for Brandom’s overall project of analyzing
meaning in terms of inferential practices.
The first difficulty is that (2), which connects committive consequence with
permissive consequence, is somewhat odd, in that it implies that any deductive
14That committive consequences are not defeasible can be attested by the following claim: “The
first sort, commitment-preserving inferential relations, is a generalization, to include the case
of non-logical, material inferences, of obligatory, deductive inferential relations” (BSaD, p. 120,
emphasis added).
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inference corresponds to an inductive inference. In other words, since p unionsq→q
means that there is a sound (material) deduction from p to q, (2) implies
that there is a plausible (material) induction from p to q. This does not make
much sense. Deduction and induction are categorically different concepts, not
concepts that differ in ‘strength’.15 Such a distinction points towards what may
seem the right interpretation of the proof of (2). For this proof shows that from
p unionsq→q we can deduce that entitlement to q is inherited from entitlement to p.
However, the definition of permissive consequence is that from entitlement to
p we can ‘defeasibly infer’ entitlement to q, that is, permissive consequence
does not refer to inheritance of entitlement. In other words, the proof of
(2) does not connect committive consequence and permissive consequence
(despite Brandom’s own claim in CCDP that it does).
Now, we must bring to the fore the fact that an adequate semantics for
natural language cannot be constructed only on the basis of the notion
of incompatibility. Brandom is clear in this respect: “Here is a semantic
suggestion: represent the propositional content expressed by a sentence with
the set of sentences that express propositions incompatible with it. [fn. 5: Since,
as has just been emphasized, incompatibility relations are only one dimension
of inferential articulation, this semantic representation of conceptual content
will necessarily be only partial.]” (BSaD, p. 123). But why are the other
dimensions of inferential articulation important? Brandom claims that “any
autonomous discursive practice (ADP) must include practices-or-abilities of
distinguishing some inferences as materially good from others that are not. For
some bit of vocabulary to function as a propositionally contentful declarative
sentence is for it to be available to serve as the premise and conclusion of
such material inferences” (BSaD, pp.103f). One reason Brandom relies on a
three-fold inferential articulation, which includes committive and permissive
consequences besides incompatibility entailments, is that incompatibility
entailment is monotonic,16 whereas material inferences are non-monotonic
(BSaD, pp. 106f). A complete account of (meaning-constitutive) material
15That this is so can be attested by the monotonicity of deduction, as opposed to the non-
monotonicity of induction. The monotonicity of the former, and the non-monotonicity of the
latter, make part of the informal notions of deduction and induction. We acknowledge the fact that
part of Brandom’s program is precisely to give a different analysis of these terms, for instance, by
taking a primitive notion of materially valid inferences that is prior to a discussion of preservation
of truth. But of course, his analysis is still accountable towards the well-established, informal
notions of deduction and induction. Brandom also seems to assume that this distinction in terms
of (non-)monotonicity exists in the case of deduction and induction (cf. BSaD, p. 120).
16In fact, it can be proved that incompatibility entailment is monotonic, given that the relation of
incompatibility is governed by the principle of persistence. Persistence of incompatibility says that
“if one set of claims is incompatible with another, so too is any larger set containing it. That is, one
cannot remove or repair an incompatibility by throwing in some further claims” (BSaD, p. 123).
In particular, the principle of persistence says that if p and q are incompatible, so are {p} ∪  and
q. This principle entails monotonicity of incompatibility entailment. Suppose p incompatibility
entails q. Does {p} ∪  incompatibility entail q? The answer is: yes. If s is incompatible with q, it is
incompatible with p, and hence it is incompatible with {p} ∪ .
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inferences requires a notion of non-monotonic inference that incompatibility
entailment cannot provide, or at least not on its own.17 Note that the mono-
tonicity of incompatibility entailment, and the non-monotonicity of permissive
consequence, is yet another reason, in view of (1), to reject (2).18
Moreover, as a second difficulty, Brandom claims that committive conse-
quence is intended to correspond to deductive (material) inference and that
incompatibility entailment is intended to correspond to robust inference. The
question now is whether, given their equivalence, we can keep the promise of
this correspondence. In the end, the gist of the problem is whether the notion
of deductive consequence is the same as, or equivalent to, the notion of robust
inference. According to Brandom, the notion of incompatibility entailment has
an intrinsic modal ingredient. He presents this in terms of an example:
The fact that the properties of being a donkey and being a mammal stand
in the relation of incompatibility entailment means that every property
incompatible with being a mammal is incompatible with being a donkey.
. . . We could say: “Necessarily anything that is a donkey is a mammal”
(BSaD, pp. 122, emphasis in the original).
However, compare this quote with a traditional formulation of deductive
inference, namely the one offered by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. Clearly,
it also has a modal component from the start:
A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, some-
thing other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so
(Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24b19-20, emphasis added).
There is nothing distinctive in Brandom’s presentation of robust inference
in terms of incompatibility entailment that is not already captured by the
traditional notion of deductive inference. We take it that a consequence of
(1) and (3) is that, thus formulated, the notion of robust consequence collapses
into the notion of deductive inference.19
It is worth noting that, if our intuitions about robust inference were
stronger—that is, sharply distinct from our intuitions about deductive
inference—, on the face of (1) and (3) we would have to revise the definition
17The step from the more familiar idea that (non-monotonic) material inferences bestow meaning
on sentences—e.g., that it is in virtue of the meanings of “west” and “east” that there is a material
inference from “A is to the west of B” to “B is to the east of A”—, to the claim that “there
is an intimate connection between the conceptual contents expressed by vocabularies and the
counterfactually robust inferences they are involved in” (BSaD, p. 122), depends on an argument
about ‘tractability’ of the “practical task of updating the rest of one’s beliefs when some of them
change” (BSaD, p. 109) the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
18The gist of the points in this paragraph has been suggested by an anonymous referee.
19While there does not seem to be a difference between robust and deductive consequence, there
is, however, an important difference between incompatibility entailment and committive conse-
quence: the fact that incompatibility entailment is essentially an ontic notion while committive
entailment is essentially a pragmatic notion (cf. BSaD, pp. 191ff). But this is not the place to
pursue this criticism.
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of either incompatibility entailment or of committive consequence in order to
justify the claim that they are distinct and thus to save the intended connections
between Brandom’s notions and the more ‘familiar’ ones. Alternatively, (1)
and (3) may in fact suggest the need for a revision of our own intuitions about
robust inference.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the internal logical relations between the
definitions offered by Brandom himself of three kinds of entailment relations:
incompatibility entailment, committive consequence and permissive conse-
quence. We conclude that the idea that incompatibility entailment, committive
consequence, and permissive consequence correspond to robust inference, de-
ductive inference, and inductive inference, respectively, must be abandoned—
at least if robust inference is meant to be something different from deductive
inference. There are no three different notions of inference emerging from
Brandom’s definitions, but at most two. And insofar as Brandom’s inferential-
ist pragmatism relies crucially on the identification of robust inference with in-
compatibility entailment, of deductive inference with committive consequence,
and of inductive inference with permissive consequence, the results presented
here may have important implications also for the cogency and strength of his
general program. But for now this will remain a topic for further research.
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